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Abstract
We study how entrepreneurs and households share the monopolistic prot from
inventions would a¤ect growth. The share to the entrepreneur is called entrepre-
neurs inventive incentive (EII). First, there are two representative agents (a borrow-
ing entrepreneur and a household who provides the nancing capital), both making
intertemporal savings decisions. Second, the two agents sign credit contracts to
deal with asymmetric information. A larger EII elicits more entrepreneurse¤ort,
increasing the monopolistic prot from innovations (a "bigger cake" e¤ect); it, how-
ever, leaves a smaller share of the cake to households. Initially, the former e¤ect
dominates, but beyond a point, the latter e¤ect dominates. As the cake becomes
bigger, if the creditors share gets too small, her return (the product of the size of
the cake and her share in the cake) may decrease and she would be less willing to
save to nance R&D. Therefore, growth is an inverted-U function of EII.
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The Impact of the Distribution of Property Rights on
Inventions on Growth: A Two-Representative-Agent Model
with Asymmetric Information
The entrepreneurial function is not, in principle, connected with the possession of wealth...He
can only become an entrepreneur by previously becoming a debtor...What he rst wants is
credit...He is the typical debtor in capitalist society.Schumpeter (1961, 101-102)
1 Introduction
One basic issue concerning production is why some countries persistently grow slower than
others. For example, the annual growth from 1960 to 2000 was above 4% and below 0%
for 3 East Asian countries (China, Japan and South Korea) and 14 sub-Saharan African
countries respectively (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002). There are numerous theories
tackling the basic issue. Recently, Aghion and Howitt (2006), for example, use competition
in R&D (i.e., rm entry/exit) to explain the substantial cross-country di¤erences in growth
rates. Inspired by Schumpeter (1961), we use the di¤erence in the distribution of property
rights on inventions to explain the observed long-run growth di¤erentials.
Following Schumpeter, credit-constrained entrepreneurs have to borrow from the house-
holds to nance innovations. In the presence of nancial imperfections, how the entrepre-
neurs and the households share the monopolistic prot from innovations (i.e., the property
rights on inventions) would a¤ect long-run growth. Similar to the atemporal landlord-
tenantproblem (Stiglitz, 1974; La¤ont and Matoussi, 1995; Cheung, 1968), we dene this
as an intertemporal capital lord-entrepreneurproblem, which is useful for understanding
the dynamics of long-run growth and income inequality in capitalist society.1 In so doing,
we apply the insights from the landlord-tenantproblem or the linear compensation con-
tracts in the principal-agent literature (particular from authors such as Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1987; La¤ont and Tirole, 1986) to the endogenous growth setting.
We contribute to the growth literature by incorporating two important real world
features into endogenous growth models. First, there are two representative agents: an
entrepreneur and a worker. They both make intertemporal savings and consumption
decisions. This di¤ers from the one representative agent assumption in most new growth
models (NGMs) (e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).2 Aghion and Howitt (1998,
p. 66) criticize that one shortcoming of the NGMs lies in their simple representation
of R&D activities. Previous attempts to overcome this shortcoming still keep the one
1In terms of issues involved in contracting, the landlord-tenantproblem is similar to our problem.
The former is about arable land whose supply is xed, while our problem is concerned with capital that
can be accumulated to generate endogenous growth that is dynamic in essence. Malinvaud (1961), for
example, analyzes the analogy between atemperoal and intertemporal theories of resource allocation.
2For early attempts to endogenize growth, see Acemoglu (2008) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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representative agent framework.3 With two representative agents, we are able to study
how the distribution of the monopolistic prot from innovations between entrepreneurs
and workers-nanciers (a richer representation of R&D activity) impacts long-run growth.
This di¤ers from Banerjee and Newman (1993) who emphasize the distribution of wealth
in a¤ecting economic growth.
Second, we emphasize the role of nancial imperfections (i.e., the asymmetric infor-
mation between entrepreneurs and households).4 Given nancial imperfections, credit
contract plays an important role, unlike in many NGMs. Many works (e.g., Townsend,
1979; Williamson, 1987; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) study credit contracts in the pres-
ence of information asymmetry, but few are concerned with endogenous growth.5 Aghion
and Tirole (1994), for example, study the contractual arrangements of R&D when en-
trepreneurs e¤ort is hidden action, leaving the relationship between entrepreneurs e¤ort
and growth unexplored. Many studies that incorporate nancial imperfection in a growth
setting either investigate issues other than long-run growth (e.g., Aghion and Bolton 1997;
Aghion et al., 1999; Aghion et al., 2005)6 or have "little gain in terms of new economic
insights" (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 69) (e.g., King and Levine, 1993).
The new economic insights of our model are as follows. The share of the monopolis-
tic prot from innovations distributed to entrepreneurs is termed as the entrepreneurs
inventive incentive (hereafter, EII). Our main prediction is that long-run growth is an
inverted-U function of the EII. The mechanism is as follows. On the one hand, a higher
EII means that entrepreneurs keep a higher share of the marginal benet of their e¤ort.
Resultantly, they contribute more e¤ort in R&D, yielding a larger monopolistic prot
from each innovation.7 Specically, with two representative agents and the asymmetric
information that exists between them (e.g., entrepreneurs e¤ort is unobservable to oth-
ers), the entrepreneur chooses e¤ort to maximize her share (rather than the whole share)
of the prot from innovations. Therefore, the entrepreneurs optimal e¤ort increases with
her share, generating a bigger cake.8 On the other hand, a higher EII leaves a smaller
share to households. This smaller household sharee¤ect is not captured by the one-
representative-agent NGMs. When the EII is low, the former e¤ect dominates, but beyond
a point, the latter e¤ect dominates. As in previous NGMs, long-run growth is linear in
the return to the capital/savings of the household-creditor. As the cake gets bigger, if
the creditors share in the cake gets too small, her return (the product of the size of the
3Aghion and Howitt (1998, p. 66) argue that the relaxation of the one individual assumption is
typically made within rms where employee as inventors are subject to assignment contracts with their
employers who provide the nancing and physical capital. It is still a representative agent model.
4Paulson et al. (2006) show the existence of credit market imperfections with Thailand data.
5Williamson (1987) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) focus on explaining business cycles.
6Aghion et al. (2005), for example, introduce nancial market frictions into NGMs to show that
nancial development matters for growth only at the early stage of economic development.
7La¤ont and Matoussi (1995) provide empirical evidence that e¢ ciency is lower when the tenants
share of output is lower given moral hazard and nancial constraints.
8Even if the entrepreneur saves through nancial intermediaries, she, due to the large market e¤ect,
will not take into account the e¤ect (externality) of her e¤ort on the whole economy.
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cake and her share in the cake) becomes lower. Resultantly, she would be less willing
to save to nance R&D, lowering long-run growth. A numerical example conrms the
inverted-U result and shows that having the optimal EII could increase annual growth by
0.4 percentage points.9 We further show that the income ratio between entrepreneurs and
households is an increasing function of EII.10 Moreover, a poverty trap emerges if EII is
too low or too high.11
Cross-country di¤erences in the distribution of property rights on inventions, therefore,
may o¤er one explanation for the observed substantive country-level growth di¤erentials.
Why have some Asian countries been more successful in achieving higher growth? Taking
China as an example, we argue that the economic reform of China since 1978 has un-
leashed entrepreneursinventive spirit by allowing them to retain a larger fraction of the
prot from innovations (see Li et al., 2009), ending up promoting growth. Meanwhile,
the 14 sub-Saharan African countries have negative growth, because the entrepreneurs
inventive spirit may have been constrained at a low level. Therefore, less e¤ort would be
forthcoming from the entrepreneurs, which lowers the return to innovations and thereby
makes households less willing to nance R&D. A poverty trap emerges.
Our theoretical predictions are general in the sense that they do not depend on the par-
ticular information structure of the economy (i.e., the particular form of credit contract).
Therefore, the rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we develop a model with
hidden action (or moral hazard, i.e., entrepreneurse¤ort is unobservable to others). To
resemble the real world credit market, in section 3, we further show that the inverted-U
result exists with both hidden information (two unobserved types of entrepreneurs) and
hidden action. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Model with Moral Hazard
To study the intertemporal capital lord-entrepreneurproblem, we use the NGM with ex-
panding varieties to include two representative agents, nancial imperfections and credit
contracts.12 The economy consists of a nal goods sector, an intermediate goods sector,
entrepreneurs, nancial intermediaries, and workers. Each intermediate good represents
an innovation. Each innovation is a project that is conducted by an entrepreneur. The in-
novation cost (the cost of R&D) of each intermediate good is a xed amount, . We assume
that the nancing capital for R&D (i.e., ) totally comes from nancial intermediaries that
9Solow (2001) argues: Adding a couple of tenths of a percentage point to the growth rate is an
achievement that eventually dwarfs in welfare signicance any of the standard goals of economic policy.
Who would not be excited?Similar arguments are given in Barro and Sala-i-Martion (2004, p. 6).
10There is a large literature studying how inequality a¤ects growth (e.g., Aghion et al., 1999). Unlike
Persson and Tabellini (1994) who argue that inequality decreases growth, inequality and growth in our
model are simultaneously determined by the distribution of property rights on inventions.
11There is also a large literature on poverty trap. For one that is concerned with nancial intermedi-
aries, please see Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996).
12For the original NGM with expanding varieties, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 6).
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absorb savings from households (workers as well as entrepreneurs).13 Entrepreneurs have
to borrow from nancial intermediaries in the amount of  to nance their innovations.
Therefore, following Schumpeter (1961), only external nancing is considered.14
The rst representative agent is an entrepreneur who has double identities: As an
entrepreneur, she borrows from nancial intermediaries to nance her innovation; as a
saver, she makes intertemporal savings decisions and saves through nancial intermedi-
aries. The second is a worker who also makes intertemporal savings decisions and saves
through nancial intermediaries. We refer to savers as households.
Intermediate goods are inputs of the nal goods sector. A nal goods rm produces a
single consumption good using the aggregate production function in equation (1):
Y =
NX
j=1
Xj
 eAjL1  ; (1)
where N is the number of innovations, Xj is the amount of intermediate good j, eAj is
the stochastic productivity of intermediate good j with all eA0js distributed on the interval
[0; A], and L is the labor force. Each j is supplied by a monopolistic entrepreneur. The
random variable eAj has a probability density function (PDF) f (x; e), where e ( 0) stands
for the e¤ort level contributed by the entrepreneurs. The e¤ort level cannot be observed by
the nancial intermediaries (i.e., hidden action, or a moral hazard problem). We assume
that Fe (x; e) < 0 (i.e., the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of eAj with high e¤ort
rst-order-stochastically dominates that with lower e¤ort. That is, an increase in e raises
the expected return of the projects.) and Fee (x; e)  0.
When there is only hidden action in situations in which the nancial intermediaries
are assumed to be risk neutral and the entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk averse, the
optimal contract can be a linear sharing contract (i.e., the equity contract here in our
model). The linear contracts are shown to be robust in a wild range of situations by, for
instance, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and La¤ont and Tirole (1986). For any proof
on this, please see also, for instance, La¤ont and Matoussi (1995), Lacker and Weinberg
(1989) and Stiglitz (1974). The equity contract species that, the nancial intermediaries
provide the nancing capital for R&D (i.e., ), and share the monopolistic prot from
innovations with the entrepreneurs, with the entrepreneursshare given as  2 [0; 1] (the
measure of the EII).  is assumed to be exogenously xed by the structure of the economy
(e.g., the legal and policy restrictions on the entry into production and intermediation,
and the number of entrepreneurs and nancial intermediaries).
13The results hold if we only let workers save. Nonetheless, we allow entrepreneurs to save via nancial
intermediaries. Therefore, households refer to savers.
14Self-nancing does exist as in Thailand (Paulson et al., 2006), but we follow Schumpeter (1961) (see
the quote at the beginning of this paper) to focus on external nancing because R&D usually involves
large volume of investment that far exceeds the wealth of each entrepreneur and workers can save in the
nancial system to nance entrepreneurial R&D. In addition, without changing the predictions, we, for
simplicity, assume that entrepreneurs do not need collateral in borrowing from nancial intermediaries.
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In this section, we use the ad hoc assumption that the share of the entrepreneurs (i.e.,
) is exogenously given to illustrate the mechanism at play. Even though in the standard
sharecropping framework, the share (i.e., ) may be endogenously determined by the
bilateral contracting between the entrepreneurs and the nanciers, it is also a¤ected by
the structure of the economy that shapes the contracting environment and a¤ects the
relative bargaining power of the agents. Therefore,  should be viewed as measuring the
underlying exogenous primitives of the economy. For this reason, we assume an exogenous
 in illustrating the mechanism of our model in a simplest way.
The economy consists of a xed amount of people. The assigning of occupation is
through a simple win-or-lose lottery. Those who lose the lottery become workers who
have unit labor endowment and supply it to nal goods rms. The total number of
workers is L. Those who win the lottery become entrepreneurs. Then people cannot
change their occupations, which is di¤erent from previous works in which occupational
choices are endogenous (e.g., Aghion and Bolton 1997; Banerjee and Newman 1993).15
We assume innite horizon and agents live forever. We assume that the objective
functions of the entrepreneurs and the workers have the same form:
Max
e;c
Z 1
0
[c N  h (e)]1    1
1   exp ( t) dt; (2)
where h (e) is the cost of e¤ort, which is additive to consumption c;16 N is the number of
innovations;  is the constant rate of time preference;  is degree of constant relative risk
averse (CRRA). We assume that h (0) = h0 (0) = 0 , h
0
(e) > 0, and h00 (e) > 0. For the
entrepreneurs, their objective function consists of two parts: the utility from consumption,
and the disutility of e¤ort. Workers maximize the case of h (0) = 0.
In the end, the ex post realization of eA is known to everyone. Entrepreneurs pay back
their loans in accordance with the contracts. The timing of the model is as follows:
1. The agents make their savings decisions, and if they save, they must save through
nancial intermediaries. Then the lottery for the patents on the intermediate goods
is announced. Those who win the lottery become entrepreneurs.
2. The entrepreneurs borrow credit from nancial intermediaries by signing an equity
contract. The e¤ort of entrepreneurs cannot be observed by others. The entrepre-
neurs determine how much e¤ort to put into R&D, which depends on .
3. eA is realized and the prot from innovations is distributed according to the contracts.
15When the entrepreneurs prot increases, more people may choose to be entrepreneurs, which drives
down the prot of the entrepreneurs. Since our model does not have occupational choice, this e¤ect does
not exist. We leave the consideration of occupational choice to future research.
16This assumption is crucial to ensure that the credit contract problem becomes an intratemporal one,
so our main intertemporal problem is about consumption and saving. Relaxing this assumption would
not yield tractable solutions and is left to future research.
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2.1 Final Goods Firms and Intermediate Goods Firms
A nal goods rm produces a single nal good using the production function in equation
(1). It maximizes its prot by taking as given the wage rate, the prices of intermediate
goods, and the ex post realization of eAj. The demand for the j-th intermediate is obtained
from the FOC (rst-order condition) associated with Xj : Xj = eAjL Pj 11  .
An innovation transforms one unit of nal good into one unit of an intermediate good.
Normalizing nal goodsprice as one, the unit cost to intermediate goods rms is also one.
After invention is done, an intermediate good rm j maximizes its prot, taking as given
the demand from the nal good rm. Its price mark-up is Pj = 1 , and the monopoly
prot is j = eAjL   1   1 21  = l  eAj, where l is constant and equal to L  1   21  .
2.2 The Equity Contract
The equity contract species that the entrepreneurs and the nancial intermediaries share
the monopolistic prot from innovations, with the entrepreneursshare given as  2 [0; 1],
which, therefore, makes the contracting problem become trivial.
The entrepreneurs choose optimal e¤ort by
Max
e
U = 
Z A
0
l  xf (x; e) dx  h (e) ; (3)
where l is constant and equal to L
 
1 



2
1  . The rst order condition is
dU
de
= l
Z A
0
 Fe (x; e) dx

  h0 (e) : (4)
The second order condition is d
2U
de2
= l
R A
0
 Fee (x; e) dx

  h00 (e). Given the assump-
tions, we have dU
de
je=0 > 0 and d2Ude2 < 0. Therefore, there is a unique e > 0 that solves
equation (3). Di¤erentiating equation (4) with respect to  and e yields
de
d
=  
l
R A
0
 Fe (x; e) dx

d2U
de2
> 0;
which states that higher e¤ort would be forthcoming from the entrepreneurs, should they
receive a larger share of the prot from innovations (i.e., a higher ).
Given the entrepreneursproblem, the nancial intermediarys prot is
R = (1  )
Z A
0
lxf (x; e) dx = (1  )

A 
Z A
0
F (x; e) dx

: (5)
Taking derivative of R with respect to  yields
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@R
@
=  

A 
Z A
0
F (x; e) dx

+ (1  )

 
Z A
0
Fe (x; e) dx

de
d
: (6)
To move further, we make one additional assumption: h00 (e) is su¢ ciently small (or
Fe (x; e) is su¢ ciently large). Given this assumption, we have @R

@
j
=0
> 0. The proof
is trivial. Since de
d
j
=0
=
l(
RA
0  Fe(x;e)dx)
h00(e) , when h
00 (e) is su¢ ciently small, de
d
j
=0
will
be su¢ ciently large to make sure @R

@
j
=0
> 0. Moreover, the assumption ensures that
@2R
@2
< 0. When  = 1, @R

@
j
=1
< 0. Therefore, the return to savings in the nancial
intermediaries is an inverted-U function of , which will be used in proving proposition 2.
2.3 The Interest Rate
The nancial intermediaries represent those who save. Using the free-entry condition in
the intermediary services (i.e., the value of each project to the nancial intermediary (V )
is equal to the cost of nancing each project, ) and the asset equation (i.e., the period
capital return is equal to the ow prot of the rms), the expected interest rate is
rV = r = R =) r = R


: (7)
2.4 The Behavior of Households and the General Equilibrium
Proposition 1. The model has a balanced growth path.
Proof: The model has two representative agents: a worker and an entrepreneur. We
rst prove that the consumption growth rate of a worker is same as that of an entrepreneur.
A typical worker maximizes the present discounted value of her consumption stream
Max
c
Z 1
0
c1    1
1   exp ( t) dt
s:t: c+ (1  )

N = wL+ (1  )rN;
where (1  ) 2 (0; 1) is the share of R&D cost covered by the savings of the workers in
the nancial intermediaries, which is xed on a balanced growth path.17 On a balanced
growth path, the workers nance (1   ) share of the R&D cost and receive (1   )
share of the prots from R&D via the nancial intermediary. Solving Hamiltonian: H =
e t c
1  1
1  + 

wL+(1 )rN c
(1 )

yields the growth rate of workersconsumption as

c
c
=
1

(r   ) =
(1  )
h
A  R A
0
F (x; e) dx
i

  

; (8)
17Otherwise, in steady state,  approaches either 1 or 0. Both cases are simpler and growth rate
is determined by the savings of either entrepreneurs or workers. When  is unity, it becomes a one
representative agent model like most NGMs. When  is zero (i.e., the entrepreneurs do not save), the
proof of the existence of a balanced growth path will be much simpler and the results of the paper hold.
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where the last equality uses equation (7). The objective function of the entrepreneur is
Max
e;c
Z 1
0
[c N  h (e)]1    1
1   exp ( t) dt
s:t: c+ 

N = N (e) + rN:
Similarly, on a balanced growth path, the entrepreneur will nance  share of the R&D
cost and receive  proportion of the prots of innovations via the nancial intermedi-
aries. To solve for the entrepreneurs e¤ort, we only need to solve the period-by-period
maximization problem of the entrepreneur. To conrm this, we substitute out c in the
entrepreneurs objective function with the budget constraint to get an equivalent maxi-
mization problem of the entrepreneur as
Max
e
Z 1
0
N1 

 (e)  h(e) + rN   

N
N
1 
  1
1   exp ( t) dt:
The entrepreneurs choice of e¤ort is independent of her consumption decisions. When
the entrepreneur chooses e¤ort, she wont take into account the e¤ect of her e¤ort on
the return to the nancial intermediaries (or the balanced growth rate,

N
N
). In other
words, even though the entrepreneur saves through nancial intermediaries, she, due to
the large market e¤ect, will not take into account the e¤ect (externality) of her e¤ort on
the whole economy. Resultantly, the optimal e¤ort of the entrepreneur is governed by
maximizing equation (3), which yields e. Now dening new variables ec = c   N  h (e)
and e (e) = N (e) N  h (e), we rewrite the entrepreneurs problem as
Maxec
Z 1
0
ec1    1
1   exp ( t) dt
s:t: ec+  N = Ne (e) + rN:
Solving the Hamiltonian yields
ecec = 1 (r   ), which is the same as that for the workers.
Then it is straightforward to show that the model has a balanced growth path on which
the consumptions of the workers and the entrepreneurs, the nal output, and the number
of varieties (innovations) N grow at the same rate. Because of Barro and Sala-i-Martins
(2004, ch. 6) excellent proof of it, we shall omit the proof. Since ec and N grow at the
same rate, given that e is constant, the consumption growth rate of the entrepreneurs
ce = ec+N h (e) will also equal that of N . Therefore, on a balanced growth path, we have

c
c
=

ce
ce
=

N
N
=

Y
Y
, where c denotes the consumption of the workers, ce the consumption of
the entrepreneurs, N the number of varieties, and Y the total output. That is, di¤erent
groups of people share the same growth rate of consumption, although their consumption
levels di¤er. A workers consumption grows at rate

N
N
. An entrepreneurs income from
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savings grows at rate

N
N
, and so does her income from innovations, N , both of which
grow at rate

N
N
. Therefore, the consumption of the entrepreneurs grows at rate

N
N
.
2.5 The Growth Rate and the Entrepreneurs Inventive Incentive
Proposition 2. The balanced growth rate is an inverted-U function of .
Proof: The balanced growth rate is given in equation (8). Therefore, the balanced
growth rate is linear in the return to the savings in the nancial intermediaries (R).
Since R is an inverted-U function of  (see the proof at the end of subsection 2.2), so is
the balanced growth rate. Q.E.D. The detailed mechanism is as follows.
An increase in  (the EII) has two opposing e¤ects on the growth rate. On the one
hand, a higher  stimulates the entrepreneurs to contribute more e¤ort in R&D, raising
the expected prot from innovations. This bigger cake e¤ect pushes up the growth
rate. On the other hand, a higher  leaves a lower share to the savers-households (a
lower (1  )), which makes them less willing to nance innovations. The smaller house-
holdsshare e¤ectdecreases the growth rate. In equation (6), the bigger cake e¤ectis
(1  )

  R A
0
Fe (x; e) dx

de
d
, and smaller householdsshare e¤ectis 

A  R A
0
F (x; e) dx

.
When  = 0, the former e¤ect dominates, so the balanced growth rate increases as  goes
up. This is mainly because a marginal increase in the EII elicits a very large increase
in entrepreneurs e¤ort. When  approaches 1, the latter e¤ect dominates because the
former e¤ect approaches zero. Although a marginal increase in the EII yields a larger
cake, the share to the households is so small that its product with the size of the cake
(i.e., the return to the savings of the households) decreases. Resultantly, the growth rate
will decrease as  approaches 1. Therefore, an atemporal maximization of the whole cake
does not necessarily yield the highest growth in our intertemporal environment.
2.6 The Income Gap and the Possibility of a Poverty Trap
Although di¤erent groups of people share the same growth rate of income and consumption
on a balanced growth path, their consumption levels are di¤erent. A workers income as
well as consumption grow at rate

N
N
. An entrepreneurs income from savings grows at
rate

N
N
, and so does her income from innovations. Therefore, the di¤erence in the income
levels between the agents (i.e., the workers and the entrepreneurs) is linear in N , so it
will grow at the balanced growth rate. An increase in the EII will make it jump up
immediately. After that, it will grow at the rate of the balanced growth rate. The ratios
of the income and wealth levels between agents are xed on a balanced growth path, that
is, they are not functions of N . However, following an increase in the EII (), the income
ratio between the workers and the entrepreneurs will also jump up and then stay xed.
The possible existence of a poverty trap is presented in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. When  is too low/high, there may exist a poverty trap with no growth.
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Proof : The growth rate is given in equation (8). Therefore, when the expected return
from savings is smaller than the time preference, the agents will not save to nance
innovation. There emerges a poverty trap in which there is no endogenous growth. Q.E.D.
In least developing countries, even if the property rights are secure, if the EII is too low,
less e¤ort will be forthcoming from the entrepreneurs, lowering the return to innovations
and thereby making households unwilling to nance R&D. Similarly, if the EII is too
high, more e¤ort from the entrepreneurs yields a larger cake, however, the households
share little of the cake, which also makes them unwilling to nance R&D. To get out
of the poverty trap, setting an optimal distribution rule between the entrepreneurs who
borrow to conduct R&D and the households who save to nance R&D is desirable.
3 The Model with Hidden Information and Hidden Action
The structure of the model here is identical to that in section 2. The di¤erences are as
follows. This section deals with two types of asymmetric information: ex-ante hidden
information that involves two types of entrepreneurs (the type with good projects called
good entrepreneurs) and ex-post hidden action (good entrepreneurse¤ort that a¤ects the
return of their projects is unobservable to others).18 This information structure resembles
the real world credit market. Therefore, it is meaningful to check whether the inverted-U
relationship between long-run growth and the EII holds up. Given the information struc-
ture, the optimal contracts between the nancial intermediaries and the entrepreneurs are
assumed to be debt contracts combined with signals. Here, we prove that the debt con-
tract combined with signals can be supported as an equilibrium, but we leave the proof of
whether there may be other types of contracts (or what contracts are optimal) to future
research. Debt contract has been proven to be optimal with nonrandom auditing (see
Townsend, 1979; Williamson, 1987; Wang and Williamson, 1998). Moreover, in practice,
it is an important arrangement between the entrepreneurs and the nancial intermediaries
argued by Wang and Williamson (1998).
Specically, the random productivity of each innovation ends up with PDF fg
 eA; e
with probability ; and fb
 eA with probability (1  ), with 0 <  < 1, where e ( 0)
stands for the e¤ort level contributed by the entrepreneurs. We call those projects with
PDF fg
 eA; e goodprojects, whose owners are therefore good entrepreneurs. We
term those projects with fb
 eA badprojects, whose owners are badentrepreneurs.
For simplicity, we assume that the PDF of bad projects cannot be a¤ected by the e¤ort of
bad entrepreneurs. We assume that Fg (x; e) < Fb (x), 8x 2 [0; A], that is, the CDF of the
random productivity of a good project rst-order-stochastically dominates that of a bad
one. Therefore, a good project always has a higher mean value of A (a higher expected
prot). Moreover, we assume Fe (x; e) < 0 and Fee (x; e)  0.
18Ex ante and ex post (i.e., before or after contract is signed) information asymmetry problems have
been reviewed in Mas-Colell et al. (1995, chs. 13 and 14).
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Before any R&D is conducted, the ex ante types of the projects are unknown to all
parties, so the entrepreneurs must sign a basic debt contract with the nancial interme-
diaries to get credit for their R&D. That is, the debt contract is signed as if the projects
were bad ones (please see section 3.1 for the detailed terms of a basic debt contract), which
turns out to give bad entrepreneurs just their reservation utility. The optimality for the
nancial intermediaries to do so is given in Lemma 6 and the discussion following Lemma
6. After the entrepreneurs spend their credit in R&D, nature determines the types of their
projects. Specically, some entrepreneurs end up with goodprojects, while the rest end
up with bad ones. The type is hidden information. Moreover, good entrepreneurs
e¤ort is unobservable to others (i.e., hidden action, or a moral hazard problem).
Those entrepreneurs who have good projects will nd it optimal to spend & in sig-
naling to renegotiate the terms of their contracts. Receiving the signal, the nancial
intermediaries will agree to change the terms of the contract to elicit more entrepreneurs
e¤ort, ending up with a higher return to both themselves and the entrepreneurs. The new
contract is unattractive to the entrepreneurs with bad projects, so a separating signaling
equilibrium exists. The good entrepreneurs and the nancial intermediaries use costless
Nash bargaining to share the monopolistic prot from innovations, and the entrepreneurs
share (i.e., bargaining power) is given as  2 [0; 1] (the measure of the EII).19 , which
has a di¤erent role to play here, is assumed to be exogenously determined by the state and
structure of the economy as discussed in section 2. Each entrepreneur has a reservation
utility, u, for each period.
Although contract renegotiation is often studied in case of a looming bankruptcy (e.g.,
as a part of a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy law), many also
investigate rm-driven renegotiations in case of success, for example, by switching from
single to multiple banking relations. Bannier (2007), for example, argues: Particularly
young and small rms may nd it di¢ cult to credibly signal their quality in order to
access the capital markets...Increasing information precision along the duration of the
relationship [between the rm and the bank] should allow a more e¢ cient renegotiation
of credit conditions...First, due to her ability to renegotiate repayment conditions, the
relationship bank may ease or tighten the rms nancial constraints by asking for a lower
or higher repayment rate...the former leads to a benecial smoothing of the rms budget
constraints.This supports our type of renegotiation between the successful entrepreneurs
(i.e., those with good projects) and the nancial intermediaries.
In the end, the ex post realization of eA is known to everyone. Entrepreneurs pay back
their loans in accordance with the contracts. The timing of the model is as follows:
1. The agents make their savings decisions, and if they save, they must save through
nancial intermediaries. Then the lottery for the patents to the intermediate goods
19It may seem unclear why need so many elements for our results. However, the assumptions are
necessary (and su¢ cient) ( proven in the working paper version of our model).
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is announced. Those who win the lottery become entrepreneurs.
2. The entrepreneurs borrow from the nancial intermediaries by signing a basic debt
contract. After they spend credit on R&D, nature determines the types of the
projects. The type and e¤ort of the entrepreneurs cannot be observed by others.
3. If the projects turn out to be good, their owners have incentives to signal themselves
to renegotiate with the nancial intermediaries. In a separating equilibrium, after
choosing e¤ort, the good entrepreneurs determine how much to spend in signaling.
Receiving the signal, the nancial intermediaries agree to share the di¤erence in
the prots between the good projects and bad ones with the good entrepreneurs
according to costless Nash bargaining. The share of the good entrepreneurs is .
The owners of the bad projects nd it optimal to stick to the original contract.
4. eA is realized and the prot from innovations is distributed according to the contracts.
The problem of nal goods rms and that of intermediate goods rms are identical to
those in section 2.1. Therefore, in the following we rst study the optimal debt contracts.
3.1 Debt Contracts
Initially, a basic debt contract is o¤ered to all entrepreneurs. The basic debt contract is
signed according to a project with PDF fb
 eA, and it states a payback rule as follows.
The nancial intermediary pays the R&D cost, . If the ex post eA is on the interval [Db; A]
with 0 < Db < A, the entrepreneur pays back Db  l, where l is constant and equal to
L
 
1 



2
1  ; if the realization of eA is on the interval [0; Db], the entrepreneur announces
bankruptcy and the nancial intermediary takes over the project without additional cost.
In a separating signaling equilibrium, the good entrepreneurs will nd it optimal to sig-
nal their revealed type to secure a new debt contract. The new debt contract is unattrac-
tive to entrepreneurs whose projects turn out to be bad ones. We use backward induction
to solve the separating signaling equilibrium.
3.1.1 Solving the Separating Signaling Equilibrium Taking E¤ort as Given
Step 1. Solving the Basic Debt Contract
In a separating signaling equilibrium, bad entrepreneurs nd it optimal to spend nothing
in signaling (i.e., they do not signal themselves) and stick to the basic debt contract:
The entrepreneurs prot is
(
l 
 eA Db ; if eA 2 [Db; A]
0 ; if eA 2 [0; Db]
The nancial intermediary receives
(
l Db ; if eA 2 [Db; A]
l  eA ; if eA 2 [0; Db]
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whereDb needs to be solved for. The bad entrepreneurs must accept the terms of the basic
debt contract, a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er by the nancial intermediary. The reason is that
the nancial intermediaries have rst-mover advantage. By a costless Nash bargaining
assumed in our paper, the nancial intermediaries will make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er
that just gives the bad entrepreneurs their reservation utility. The nancial intermediarys
problem is to maximize its expected prot, subject to the bad entrepreneurs participation
constraint: The bad entrepreneur earns at least as much as her reservation utility u.
Solving the nancial intermediarys problem in equations (9) and (10) delivers lemma 1.
Max
Db
Rb =
Z Db
0
l  xfb (x) dx+ l Db [1  Fb (Db)] (9)
s:t: b =
Z A
Db
l  (x Db) fb (x) dx  u (10)
Lemma 1 The optimal Db is set to yield that the bad entrepreneur earns her reservation
utility, and the nancial intermediary gets the total expected prot from a bad project less
the entrepreneurs reservation utility.
Proof: At optimality, the participation constraint in equation (10) binds: b = u. That
is, a bad entrepreneur receives her reservation utility. Integrating (10) by parts yields the
optimal Db as in equation (11). Integrating the nancial intermediarys objective function
by parts and using equation (11), its expected prot from nancing a bad project, given
in equation (12), is the total expected prot from a bad project, lEb
 eA, less the bad
entrepreneurs reservation utility, u. Q.E.D.
Db  
Z Db
0
Fb (x) dx = Eb
 eA  u
l
(11)
Rb = l  Eb
 eA  u (12)
Step 2. Solving the Debt Contract for Entrepreneurs with Good Projects
The entrepreneurs with good projects nd it optimal to renegotiate with the nancial
intermediaries for a new contract. To do so, they have to spend & in signaling and bear
all of the cost of signaling. The terms of the new debt contract are
The entrepreneurs prot is
(
l 
 eA Dg  &; if eA 2 [Dg; A]
  & ; if eA 2 [0; Dg]
The nancial intermediary receives
(
l Dg ; if eA 2 [Dg; A]
l  eA ; if eA 2 [0; Dg]
where Dg and & need to be determined. The di¤erence between this debt contract and the
basic one is that, the good entrepreneurs must signal their type each period to renegotiate
Dg with the nancial intermediaries. Specically, the good entrepreneurs and the nancial
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intermediaries use Nash bargaining to divide the di¤erence in prots between a good
project and a bad one, with the good entrepreneursshare being .
The good entrepreneursdecision on e¤ort is independent of their consumption deci-
sions, which is proved in proposition 1. The good entrepreneursobjective is
Max
e;&
Ug =
Z A
Dg
l  (x Dg) fg (x; e) dx  h (e)  & (13)
subject to
[1] Dg is determined by Nash bargaining;
[2] The bad entrepreneursincentive constraint, which makes sure the contract of {&; Dg}
is not better than {0; Db};
[3] The good entrepreneurs incentive constraint, which makes sure the contract of
{&; Dg (e
)} is not worse than {0; Db (be)};
[4] The good entrepreneurs earn at least as much from contract {0; Db (be)};
[5] The nancial intermediariesincentive constraint, that is, they earn at least as much
from contract {&; Dg (e
)} as that from contract {0; Db (be)}.
where be and e are the e¤ort levels of the good entrepreneurs corresponding to Db and
Dg respectively. Now the nancial intermediarys prot is
Rg = l
Z Dg
0
xfg (x; e) dx+ l Dg [1  Fg (Dg; e)] :
Now solving the good entrepreneursmaximization problem proceeds as follows.
Constraints [1], [4] and [5] are considered rst.
Constraints [4] and [5] are determined by the case of  = 0, in which the nancial inter-
mediaries stick to o¤er the same basic debt contract Db to both types of entrepreneurs.
The good entrepreneurs will not signal themselves and contribute an optimal amount of
e¤ort, denoted as be, into their projects. be is solved as
be = argmax
e
Ug =
Z A
Db
l  (x Db ) fg (x; e) dx  h (e) : (14)
Given be and Db , the good entrepreneur and the nancial intermediaries receive
bUg = Z A
Db
l  (x Db ) fg (x; be) dx  h (be) (15)
bRg = lDb   Z Db
0
Fg (x; be) dx ; (16)
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which are their reservation utilities in Nash Bargaining.
If  > 0, then the good entrepreneurs have incentives to signal themselves. Since
they bear the signaling cost, it is not involved in renegotiation. Receiving the signal, the
nancial intermediary and the good entrepreneur use a costless Nash bargaining to divide
the prot from the good project less the sum of their reservation prices given in equations
(15) and (16). The sum of the two partiesreservation utilities is b(be) = lEg  eA; be h (be),
which is the total prot from a good project less the cost of good entrepreneurs e¤ort in
the case of  = 0. Given Db , the reservation prices are already determined.
Using Nash bargaining to deal with constraints [4] and [5]:
Max
Dg

ug   bUg Rg   bRg1 
where ug and Rg are the utility of the good entrepreneur and the prot of the nan-
cial intermediary in the new debt contract respectively. The solution is ug   bUg =

1 

Rg   bRg. Given ug   bUg+Rg   bRg = (e) b(be), where(e) = lEg  eA; e 
h (e) and b(be) = bUg + bRg = lEg  eA; be  h (be), we have
ug   bUg =  h(e)  b(be)i (17)
Rg   bRg = (1  ) h(e)  b(be)i (18)
The Nash bargaining solution in equations (17) and (18) says: besides their reservation
prices, the good entrepreneur receives  share of the increase in the total surplus (e) b(be), while the nancial intermediary receives the remaining (1  ) share.
If (e) > b(be), receiving the signal &, the nancial intermediary would agree to
change the basic debt contract into a new one (i.e., changing Db into D

g) for the good
entrepreneur. In so doing, the nancial intermediary receives a higher return: Rg > bRg.
Since the good entrepreneur bears all of the signaling cost, her nal utility is Ug = (ug   &).
Lemma 2 In a separating equilibrium, constraint [1] is solved, that is, Dg is solved as a
function of e¤ort. Further, Dg can be solved for independent of signal &. Moreover, Dg is
a decreasing function of ; that is,
@Dg
@
< 0:
Proof: Rg = l

Dg  
R Dg
0
Fg (x; e) dx

= (1  )
h
(e)  b(be)i+ bRg =)
l

Dg  
Z Dg
0
Fg (x; e) dx

= (1  )
h
(e)  b(be)i+ bRg (19)
From equation (19); the optimal Dg is a function of e only, independent of signal &.
Therefore, constraint [1] is solved. The reaction function of Dg as a function of e will be
used later on to pin down the optimal e¤ort level e: Taking the partial derivative of Dg
with respect to  will deliver
@Dg
@
< 0. Q.E.D.
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Now we check constraints [2] and [3].
0b =
Z A
Dg
l  (x Dg) fb (x) dx  &  b = u [2]
Ug (be) = Z A
Db
l (x Db ) fg (x; be) dx  h (be)  Ug (e) [3]
where in constraint [3], e = argmax
e
Ug =
R A
Dg
l (x Dg) fg (x; e) dx   h (e)   &; be is
determined by equation (6), and & (be) = 0.
Lemma 3 For a separating equilibrium to exist, we must have Dg < D

b ; that is, the
interest rate (Dl

) is lower for the good entrepreneurs than for the bad entrepreneurs.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition is that, the prot of the bad entrepreneurs is a decreasing function
of D. If Dg > Db , then pretending to be good entrepreneurs is unattractive to the bad
entrepreneurs, so the good entrepreneurs will not spend anything in signaling (i.e., & = 0).
Therefore, no separating equilibrium would exist.
Lemma 4 The optimal & is to make constraint [2] bind, and it is positive. In addition,
constraint [3] is satised if constraint [2] holds with equality.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The rst part of lemma 4 states that the optimal signal & makes the bad entrepreneurs
indi¤erent between the basic debt contract (Db ) and the new debt contract
 
Dg

, so they
choose to stick to the basic debt contract. Signals lower than & do not separate the two
types of the entrepreneurs, and signals higher than & give the good entrepreneurs lower
utility. Therefore, the good entrepreneurs will always spend just & in signaling.
The second part of lemma 4 reveals that the good entrepreneurs will always nd it
optimal to signal themselves to renegotiate with the nancial intermediaries. Observing
the signal &, the nancial intermediaries would agree to o¤er a new debt contract for the
good entrepreneurs. In so doing, both parties are better o¤.
3.1.2 Solving for the Optimal E¤ort Levels eg and eb
Taking into account the debt contracts solved, the entrepreneurs choose their optimal
e¤ort to maximize their utility, which produces lemma 5.
Lemma 5 eg and e

b can be solved. (1) e

b = 0. (2) If Fg (x; e) rst-order-stochastically
dominates Fb (x) and Fg (x; e) is elastic in e, then eg > be for 8 > 0, which ensures
(e) > b(be). Then constraints [1] to [5] are satised and a separating signaling equilib-
rium exists. In addition, eg is an increasing function of :
deg()
d
> 0, 8 2 [0; 1].
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Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 5 ensures the existence of a separating signaling equilibrium. After the e¤ort
levels are solved, lemma 2 yields Dg , lemma 1 delivers D

b , and lemma 4 pins down &
.
The separating signaling equilibrium with two types of debt contracts is solved.
Lemma 6 When a separating signaling equilibrium exists, if  (the share of the good
projects) is small enough, there is no pooling equilibrium that dominates the separating
equilibrium for the nancial intermediaries.
Proof: The proof is similar to those in a standard textbook. The reason is the same:
the benet of signaling (the information benet) dominates the cost of signaling. Q.E.D.
Given lemma 6, it is easy to justify why the nancial intermediaries o¤er the basic
debt contract instead of a pooling debt contract to all entrepreneurs at the beginning.
To recap, after the entrepreneurs sign a basic debt contract and spend the credit on
R&D, they know the types of their projects. If the CDF of the good projects rst-order-
stochastically dominates that of bad ones, and the CDF of the good projects is a¤ected
by entrepreneurse¤ort, then the good entrepreneurs nd it optimal to signal themselves
to renegotiate with the nancial intermediaries for a new contract. The nancial inter-
mediaries agree to do so, which elicits a higher e¤ort from the good entrepreneurs that
yields higher prots to both nancial intermediaries and the good entrepreneurs. The
cost of signaling is just high enough to make the bad entrepreneurs stick to the basic debt
contract. A separating signaling equilibrium emerges (see the illustration in gure 1).
[Figure 1 Here]
3.2 The Interest Rate and the General Equilibrium
With the existence of a separating signaling equilibrium, using the free-entry condition
and the capital-asset equation, the expected interest rate is
E (R)
r
=  =) r =
(1  )Rb + 
h bRg + (1  ) h(e)  b(be)ii

: (20)
The proof of the existence of a balanced growth path is found in section 2.4. On the
balanced growth path, the consumptions of the workers and that of the entrepreneurs,
the nal output, and N all grow at the same rate. That is,

c
c
=

cg
cg
=

cb
cb
=

N
N
=

Y
Y
, where
c denotes the consumption of the workers, cg the consumption of the good entrepreneurs,
cb the consumption of the bad entrepreneurs, N the number of varieties, and Y the total
output. Solving the Hamiltonian for the workers: H = e t c
1  1
1  + 

wL+(1 )rN c
(1 )

yields the balanced growth rate as
g =
1

(r   ) =
(1  )Rb + 
h bRg + (1  )(e)  b(be)i

  

; (21)
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where the last equality uses equation (20).
3.3 The Growth Rate and the Entrepreneurs Inventive Incentive
Proposition 3. Given the conditions in lemma 5 are satised, then @g
@
j
=0
> 0 and
@g
@
j
=1
< 0: The bigger-cake e¤ect dominates and is dominated by the smaller-household-
share e¤ect at  = 0 and  = 1 respectively. If d
2e
d2
<

@(e)
@e
de
d
(1 )   @
2(e)
@e2

de
d
2
=@(e
)
@e
,
then the balanced growth rate is an inverted-U function of  (the EII) and there exists a
unique  2 (0; 1) that maximizes the balanced growth rate.
Proof: First, if the conditions in lemma 5 are satised, then there exists a separating
signaling equilibrium in which the balanced growth rate is given in equation (21). Taking
the derivative of the balanced growth rate with respect to  produces
@g
@
=



 
h
(e)  b(be)i+ (1  ) @(e)
@e
de
d

; (22)
where (e) = lEg
 eA; e h (e) = l A  R A
0
Fg (x; e
) dx

 h (e). When  = 0, then
e = be and (e) = b(be). Given @(be)
@e
jbe > @ bUg@e jbe = 0, equation (22) delivers
@g
@
j
=b;e=be =



@(be)
@e
jbe

de
d
> 0 (23)
@g
@
j
=1
=   

h
(e)  b(be)i < 0: (24)
Taking derivative of equation (22) with respect to , we have
@2g
@2
=


 
 @(e
)
@e
de
d
+ (1  )
"
@2(e)
@e2

de
d
2
+
@(e)
@e
d2e
d2
#!
: (25)
Given that bUg = l A D   R AD Fg (x; e) dx h (e) is concave in e, then (e) must be
concave in e. It is obvious that @(be)
@e
jbe > @ bUg@e jbe = 0 because be is maximizing bUg. Given the
concavity of (e), de
d
> 0 (from lemma 5), and if d
2e
d2
<

@(e)
@e
de
d
(1 )   @
2(e)
@e2

de
d
2
=@(e
)
@e
,
we have @
2g
@2
< 0 (the balanced growth rate is an inverted-U function of ) as long as
@(e)
@e
> 0. @(e
)
@e
> 0 is ensured because the good entrepreneurs always equate their
marginal cost of e¤ort, h0 (e), with their share () of the marginal benet of e¤ort.
Therefore, too little e¤ort will be forthcoming from them, meaning the total (the combined
share of the workers and the entrepreneurs) marginal benet of e¤ort must be larger than
the marginal cost of e¤ort, h0 (e), that is, @(e
)
@e
> 0. Then, equations (23) and (24)
ensure that the balanced growth rate has a maximum at  2 (0; 1).
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An increase in  (the EII) has two opposing e¤ects on balanced growth rates. On the
one hand, a higher  stimulates the good entrepreneurs to contribute more e¤ort in R&D,
raising the expected prot from innovations, (e), because @(e
)
@e
> 0 and de
d
> 0. This
bigger cake e¤ectpushes up the growth rate. On the other hand, a higher  leaves a
lower share to households, which makes them less willing to save to nance innovation.
The smaller householdsshare e¤ectdecreases the growth rate.
In equation (22), the bigger cake e¤ectis (1  ) @(e)
@e
de
d
, and the smaller house-
holdsshare e¤ectis  
h
(e)  b(be)i. When  = 0, the former e¤ect is positive, but
the latter e¤ect is zero because
h
(ej=0)  b(be)i = (be)   b(be) = 0. Therefore, the
balanced growth rate is increasing in . As  increases from 0 to 1, the bigger cake
e¤ect is strictly decreasing. The smaller households sharee¤ect is strictly increasing
because, for one additional share given up by the household, the additional share of the
cake is bigger beause e¤ort is increasing. At , the smaller households share e¤ectjust
increases to equal the decreasing bigger cakee¤ect, and growth achieves a maximum.
When  = 1, the former e¤ect is zero while the latter e¤ect is negative, so growth is
decreasing in . Therefore, the balanced growth rate is an inverted-U function of .
The assumptions (two representative agents that make savings decisions, hidden in-
formation/type, and hidden action) are necessary for the inverted-U results with debt
contract. Without any of the assumptions, we would not get a non-monotone relation-
ship between the balanced growth rate and the EII. The detailed proof is omitted but is
available upon request.
3.4 The Income Gap and the Possibility of a Poverty Trap
The dynamics of income inequality between agents and the possible existence of a poverty
trap can be analyzed as in subsection 2.6. Although di¤erent groups of people share the
same growth rate of income and consumption on a balanced growth path, their consump-
tion levels di¤er. A workers income grows at rate

N
N
. A good entrepreneurs income
from savings grows at rate

N
N
, and so does her income from innovation, gN . A bad
entrepreneur earns dividends from nancial intermediaries and a prot from innovations,
(1  )Nu, both of which grow at rate

N
N
. Therefore, the di¤erence in the income levels
between agents is a function of N , so it will grow at the balanced growth rate. An increase
in the EII will make it jump up immediately. After that, it will grow at the balanced
growth rate. The ratios of the income and wealth levels between agents are xed on a
balanced growth path, that is, they are not functions of N . However, following an in-
crease in the EII (), the income ratio between the workers and the entrepreneurs and
that between the good and bad entrepreneurs will also jump up and then stay xed.
The possible existence of a poverty trap is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. At  = 0 or  = 1, if
h
(1  )Rb +  bRgi = < , then there exists a
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poverty trap in which there is no balanced growth.
Proof : Given the balanced growth rate in equation (21), we have
Growthj=1 =
(1  )Rb +  bRg

  

= Growthj=0.
The latter equality holds because (e)j=0 = b(be). Therefore, when the average
expected return from the two types of projects is smaller than the time preference, the
agents will not save to nance innovation. There emerges a poverty trap in which there
is no balanced growth. Q.E.D.
3.5 A Numerical Example
Here we use Maple to solve a numerical example of the model to evaluate the validity of
the theoretical predictions and appreciate the magnitude of the EIIs e¤ect on growth.
We choose the following distributions:(
Fg (x; e) =

0; x2[0;10 ln(1+0:15e)]
1 (1+0:15e) exp( 0:1x) ; e0; x2[10 ln(1+0:15e;+1)
Fb (x) = 1  exp ( 0:25x) ; x 2 [0;+1)
where e stands for e¤ort. Fg (x; e) rst-order-stochastically dominates Fb (x) (see gure
2). Both assumptions on Fg (x; e): Fg;e (x; e) < 0 and Fg;ee (x; e) = 0 are satised.
[Figure 2 Here]
The cost function of entrepreneurse¤ort is chosen as h (e) = 1
2
e2, with both assump-
tions h
0
(e) = e > 0 for e > 0 and h
00
(e) = 1 > 0 satised. A standard production
function assumes  = 1
3
, which produces the constant l = L
 
1 



2
1   0:1L. L is
the raw number of workers, which could be 108 (hundreds of millions) for large countries
such as the US and 106 (millions) for smaller countries such as Singapore. For the entre-
preneursreservation utility, u, we use per capita GDP as the measure, which is around
104  105 (tens of thousand). Hence, u
l
2 [10 3; 1]. Given Eb (x) = 4, we choose ul = 0:2,
which says that the entrepreneursreservation utility is around 5% of the total return of
the projects. To calculate the balanced growth rate,  is chosen to be one, which implies
log utility.  = 0:9 means the ex post fraction of good projects in whole projects is 90%.
Time preference  is chosen to be 0:12.20  = 50 is chosen to ensure that balanced growth
rates lie round 2% per year. All the functions and parameters are listed in Table 1.
[Table 1 Here]
The numerical model is solved as follows. First, solving the basic debt contract between
the nancial intermediaries and the bad entrepreneurs using lemma 1 yields Db = 11:98
20This is consistent with the average time preference factor of 90% in Ventura (2003).
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and Rb = 3:80. Second, we solve the debt contract between the good entrepreneurs and
the nancial intermediaries. Solving equations (14), (15) and (16) produces b% = 0:45,bUg = 3:11, bRg = 7:46, and b = bUg+ bRg = 10:57. These are the reservation prices in Nash
Bargaining. Combining equations (A11) and (19) yields the equilibrium debt contract 
Dg ; %
 for each . Lemma 4 gives &, so the separating signaling equilibrium is solved.
The equilibrium values of other endogenous variables are then calculated (see Table 2).
[Table 2 here]
The results in Table 2 conrm the validity of the lemmas and the propositions: Dg
is an decreasing function of ; e¤ort e is an increasing function of , and it increases
at a decreasing rate

d2e
d2
< 0

that ensures the balanced growth rate g is an inverted-U
function of , with   0:298maximizing the growth rate. As  increases from zero to ,
the balance growth rate increases by roughly 0.4 percentage points. If we dene Fg (x; e) =
1 (1 + e) exp ( 1x) and h (e) = e2, where , 1 and  are positive constants, then the
balanced growth rate increases more by decreasing 1 and  or increasing .21 Nonetheless,
"who would not be excited" (Solow, 2001) by the 0.4%, considering billions of people are
still su¤ering from hunger and social conicts (FAO, 200922).
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we incorporate two representative agents (a credit-constrained entrepreneur
borrows from a household to nance innovations) and micro-foundations and contractual
arrangements on R&D in the presence of hidden information and moral hazard into NGMs.
Schumpeter (1961) emphasizes that the possession of wealth is not necessary for the
entrepreneurial function because the entrepreneurs can rent capital from the households
to achieve creative destruction. The two representative agents assumption allows us to
study how agents share the monopolistic prot on inventions a¤ects long-run growth.
Moreover, nancial imperfection widely exists between the entrepreneurs and the creditors
in real world (e.g., Paulson et al., 2006) and has been used to study growth and income
inequality (e.g., Aghion et al., 1999, Banerjee and Newman, 1993) and to amplify business
uctuations (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Williamson, 1987).
Incorporating contracting into an intertemporal setting yields the household-entrepreneur
problem, in which income gap and growth are simultaneously determined by primitive pa-
rameters. Especially there exists an inverted-U relationship between EII (entrepreneurs
share) and the balanced growth rate. The implication is that, the di¤erences in the EII
can cause some economies to persistently grow slower than others. The possible existence
of a poverty trap has strong implications for least developed countries. In these countries,
21For instance, with 1 = 0:075, or  = 0:25 (let alone the combinations of changes in the parameters),
all else equal, as  increases from 0 to , the balance growth rate increases by nearly 1 percentage point.
22Please refer to http://www.wfp.org/hunger/stats for details.
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if the EII were constrained at a very low/high level, there would be no growth even if
there are secure property rights. To get out of the poverty trap, it is desirable to set an
optimal distribution rule between the entrepreneurs who borrow to conduct R&D and the
households who save to nance R&D.
Our theoretical predictions are general in the sense that many policies and institutions
have e¤ects on the distribution of property rights on inventions, which would inevitably
a¤ect long-run growth and wealth inequality. One of such issues is taxation, which is left
to future research. Nonetheless, parts of the ndings of Cagetti and Nardi (2007) on tax-
ation in the US are consistent with our predictions. Nevertheless, our paper has possible
extensions. First, which form of contract (debt or equity) is optimal in the growth setting
is left unproven. Second, the separation between consumption and leisure/e¤ort in the
utility function makes the dynamic contracting become an intratemporal one. Relaxing
this assumption would further complicate the model and prevent us from getting analytic
solutions. These important extensions are left to future research.
Appendix Proofs.
Lemma 3 For a separating equilibrium to exist, we must have Dg < D

b ; that is, the
interest rate ( Dl

) is lower for good entrepreneurs than for bad ones.
Proof: The informed good entrepreneurs must spend some of their prots to signal them-
selves. Given e¤ort, good entrepreneursutility is a decreasing function of the signal cost as in
equation (13). Good entrepreneursutility is higher if the signal is smaller.
Max
&
: U g=
Z A
Dg
l (x Dg) fg (x; e) dx  h (e) & (A1)
Then, from the prot function of bad entrepreneurs, we have
b = A D   l
Z A
D
Fb (x) dx =) @b
@D
=   [1  Fb (D)] < 0:
Thus the higher D is, the lower will be the prot of bad entrepreneurs. If Dg > Db ; then

0
b =
R A
Dg
l (x Dg) fb (x) dx < b . Good entrepreneurs will not spend anything in signaling
(& = 0) and no separating equilibrium exists. For a separating equilibrium to exist, therefore,
we must have Dg < D

b . In this case, good entrepreneurs have to make the signal so large that
it will be unprotable for bad entrepreneurs to pretend that they are good ones. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 The optimal & is to make constraint [2] bind, and it is positive. In addition,
constraint [3] is satised if constraint [2] holds with equality.
Proof: From the proof of lemma 3, good entrepreneurs utility is higher if the signal is
smaller. Now we must use constraint [2] (the bad entrepreneursIC) to pin down the signal.
By observing constraint [2], we get that the higher the signal, the lower the prot for a bad
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entrepreneur to pretend to be a good entrepreneur. Hence the optimal signal will just make
constraint [2] bind. The minimum signal that makes constraint [2] bind is
&= l
" 
Db  Dg
  Z Db
Dg
Fb (x) dx
#
(A2)
From lemma 3, Db > D

g , thus
h 
Db  Dg
  R Db
Dg
Fb (x) dx
i
> 0, and hence & > 0.
Now we can prove that constraint [3] is satised if constraint [2] holds with equality. We
have eUg (be) = R ADg l  x Dg fg (x; be) dx   h (be)   &  Ug (e), which is ensured by e =
argmax
e
Ug =
R A
Dg
l
 
x Dg

fg (x; e) dx  h (e)  &. Hence constraint [3], that is, Ug (e) >
Ug (be), is satised if eUg (be) > Ug (be). And eUg (be) > Ug (be) if and only if
bg (be)=Z A
Db
l (x Db ) fg (x; be) dx eg (be)=Z A
Dg
l
 
x Dg

fg (x; be) dx  &
The above can be simplied as & l
h 
Db  Dg
  R Db
Dg
Fg (x; be) dxi.
Given that Fg (x; 0) < Fb (x) for 8x 2 [0; A] ; and Fe (x; e) < 0, we have Fg (x; be) < Fb (x)
for 8e > 0. This together with (A2) makes sure the above equation is satised. Hence constraint
[3] is satised if constraint [2] holds with equality. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 eg and e

b can be solved. (1) e

b = 0. (2) If Fg (x; e) rst-order-stochastically
dominates Fb (x) and Fg (x; e) is elastic in e, then eg > be for 8 > 0, which ensures
(e) > b(be). Then constraints [1] to [5] are satised and a separating signaling equilib-
rium exists. In addition, eg is an increasing function of :
deg()
d
> 0.
Proof: With ug (e; ) ; Dg (e; ) and & (e; ) known to good entrepreneurs, they choose
their optimal e¤ort e by
Max
e
U (e; )= ug (e; ) & (e; ) : (A3)
We simplify & (e; ) rst. Combining equations (19), (11) and (12), we have
l
 
Db  Dg

= l
Z Db
0
Fb (x) dx 
Z Dg
0
Fg (x; e) dx

  (1  )
h
(e)  b(be)i+Rb  bRg
(A4)
Plugging equation (A4) into equation (A2) to simplify & (e; ) as
&= l
Z Dg
0
[Fb (x) dx Fg (x; e)] dx

  (1  )
h
(e)  b(be)i+Rb  bRg (A5)
Plugging ug (e; ) from equation (17) and & (e; ) from equation (A5) into equation (A3), and
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using b(be) = bUg + bRg, we get
Max
e
: U (e; )=  (e) l
Z Dg
0
[Fb (x) dx Fg (x; e)] dx

 Rb
Using (e) = l  Eg
 eA; e  h (e), and equation (12): Rb = l  Eb  eA  u, we get
Max
e
U (e; ) = l

Eg
 eA; e  Eb  eA  Z Dg
0
[Fb (x) dx Fg (x; e)] dx

  h (e) + u
= l
 Z A
Dg
[Fb (x) dx Fg (x; e)] dx
!
  h (e) + u (A6)
The latter equality using Eg
 eA; e Eb  eA = R A0 [Fb (x) dx Fg (x; e)] dx. Now, the objec-
tive of good entrepreneur will be maximizing U (e; ) by choosing e and taking into account the
reaction of Dg as a function of e as in equation (19):
Max
e
U (e; ) = l
 Z A
Dg
[Fb (x) dx Fg (x; e)] dx
!
  h (e) + u
s:t: l

Dg  
Z Dg
0
Fg (x; e) dx

= (1  )
h
(e)  b(be)i+ bRg (11)
FOC:
dU
de
= l
 Z A
Dg
 Fg;e (x; e) dx  [Fb (Dg) Fg (Dg; e)] @Dg
@e
!
  h0 (e) (A7)
From equation (19), we have
@Dg
@e
=
(1  )
R A
0
 Fg;e (x; e) dx  h0 (e)

  R Dg
0
 Fg;e (x; e) dx
1 Fg (Dg; e) (A8)
Given  = 0; then the solution corresponds to e = be; and Dg = Db with
dbUg
de
je=be;=0= l
 Z A
Db
 Fg;e (x; be) dx! h0 (be)= 0 (A9)
To see how the equilibrium values of e and Dg change with , we can proceed as follows. First,
evaluating dU
de
in equation (A7) using equation (A8) at  = 0 and be produces
dU
de
je=be;=0 = Fb (Dg) Fg (Dg; be)
1 Fg (Dg; be)
"
l
 Z A
Dg
 Fg;e (x; be) dx!  h0 (be)# (A10)
Given an innitely small increase in , good entrepreneurs and nancial intermediaries negotiate
over Dg given that good entrepreneurs will choose e by maximizing their utility subject to
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equation (19). From lemma 2, Dg is a decreasing function of , so the increase in  causes
Dg to drop from Db . Given equation (A9), the decrease of Dg will yield
dU
de
je=be;=0 > 0 sinceR A
Dg
 Fg;e (x; be) dx > R ADb  Fg;e (x; be) dx given Dg < Db and Fg;e (x; be) < 0. Now, good
entrepreneurs will adjust their e¤ort. Given U (e; ) is concave in e¤ort e (see section 4.3),
optimization given dU
de
je=be;=0 > 0 requires good entrepreneurs to increase their e¤ort from be to
eg. Therefore, optimal e¤ort e

g is an increasing function of :
deg()
d
> 0. Alternatively, total
di¤erentiating equation (A10) with respect to e and , rearranging, we can show that
deg()
d
> 0
if Fg (x; e) rst-order-stochastically dominates Fb (x) and Fg (x; e) is elastic in e.
Since U (e; ) is concave in e, (e) is also concave in e. Given dU
de
je=be;=0 > 0, then
d
de
je=be;=0 =
"
l
 Z A
Dg
 Fg;e (x; be) dx!  h0 (be)# > dU
de
je=be;=0 > 0
which produces (e) > b(be). According to the Nash bargaining solution in (17) and (18),
if (e) > b(be), then Rg > bRg and Ug > bUg. Therefore, constraints [4] and [5] are
satised. Since the constraints [1] to [5] are satised, a separating signaling equilibrium exists.
Substituting equation (A8) into equation (A7), and simplifying, we get
dU
de
=
[Fb (Dg)  Fg (Dg; e)] 
hR A
0
 Fg;e (x; e) dx
i
+ (1  Fb (Dg))
hR A
Dg
 Fg;e (x; e) dx
i
1  Fg (Dg; e)
 

1  (1  ) [Fb (Dg)  Fg (Dg; e)]
1  Fg (Dg; e)

h0 (e) (A11)
Now combining equation (A11) and equation (19) produces a two equations-two unknowns
system, which delivers the equilibrium values of
 
Dg ; e
.
With b = u and D

b are known to bad entrepreneurs, they choose their optimal e¤ort level
according to Max
e
U (e) = u  h (e), which generates eb = 0. Q.E.D.
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Table 1. Parameter Values and Functions
for Calculating Equilibrium Debt Contracts for Calculating Growth Rates
 = 1
3
h (e) = 1
2
e2  = 1
L = 107 Fg (x; e) = 1  (1 + 0:15e) exp ( 0:1x)  = 0:9
l = 106 Fb (x) = 1  exp ( 0:25x)  = 50
u = 2 105 x = eA 2 [0;+1)  = 0:12
Table 2. Equilibrium Values of Debt Contracts and Balanced Growth Rates
Given  = 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Dg = 11.98(D

b ) 11.50 11.29 11.09 10.90 10.73 10.57 10.42 10.27 10.14 10.01
e = 0.45(be) 0.73 0.86 0.95 1.01 1.06 1.10 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.19
g = 2.18 2.41 2.52 2.54 2.52 2.49 2.44 2.38 2.32 2.25 2.18
de
d
= 4.29 1.73 1.04 0.72 0.54 0.43 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.19
dg
d
= 4.60 1.06 0.30 -0.00 -0.16 -0.24 -0.30 -0.33 -0.36 -0.38 -0.39
Ug = 3.12(bUg) 3.22 3.24 3.27 3.30 3.33 3.36 3.39 3.43 3.46 3.49
Rg = 7.46( bRg) 7.58 7.64 7.66 7.65 7.63 7.60 7.57 7.53 7.49 7.46
Rb = 3.80
Dg  Db Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: g stands for the balanced growth rate; e for good entrepreneurse¤ort.
Dg Db means signaling separating equilibrium exists.
29
êDg
e*
(Db* , 0)
Ug*
(Dg*, e*)
Dg*
0
Db*
e
U higher
gUˆ
gU
~
Figure 1. EntrepreneursIndi¤erence Curves and Equilibrium Debt
Contracts
Figure 2. First-order-stochastic dominance of Fg(x; e) over Fb(x).
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